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ABSTRACT 
 
  In the context of an aging population, a consumption tax was introduced in Japan as a means to 
secure financing for social security programs, and was raised on a number of occasions. While 
consumption taxes are regressive, excise taxes also place a burden on household finances. In this 
paper, we estimate the portion of income captured by consumption and excise taxes for different 
income groups, considering the proportion of the tax burden associated with excise taxes. The results 
indicate that regressivity is present for both consumption and excise taxes. In particular, indirect 
taxes on food are considered highly regressive, giving grounds for measures aimed at reducing the 
tax burden on low-income earners. Accordingly, we quantify the redistributive effects of several 
policy patterns aimed at lessening indirect tax burdens. For taxes on food, the redistributive effects 
of reduced taxes, zero rates of taxation, and tax refunds were not significant. This is because these 
measures lower the tax burden across all income groups and do not target low-income earners only. 
As a result, alleviating the regressivity of indirect taxes requires social security policies closely 
targeted at low-income earners. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Since the cost of social security in Japan is rising due to an aging population and a low birthrate, 
an enormous quantity of long term public bonds have been issued in order to cope with the lack of 
funding for social security programs. As part of its efforts to reform and secure financial resources 
for social security, the Japanese government implemented a “Comprehensive Reform of Social 
Security and Tax,” thus raising the consumption tax. 
  Japan introduced the consumption tax as a value added tax in April 1989 in response to its aging 
society. This tax has increased from 3% in 1989 to 5% in April 1997, and to 8% in April 2014. A 
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further rate rise to 10% is planned for April 2017. While Japan’s current consumption tax rate 
includes both national and local consumption taxes, in this paper, “consumption tax” refers to these 
taxes taken together. 
  Consumption taxes are noted for their regressivity due to larger tax burdens incurred by lower 
income groups. Policy measures aimed at reducing this regressivity have been considered in the past, 
including reduced tax rates and zero taxes on food products, as well as tax refunds to lower income 
earners. As such, the Japanese government is planning to reduce food taxes once the consumption 
tax increases to 10%.  
  However, indirect taxation in Japan includes excise taxes in addition to the consumption tax. 
Figure 1 shows the burden of indirect taxes as a percentage of national income for a number of 
developed countries. As with the European VAT and American sales and use tax, the burden of 
excise taxes accounts for a considerable share of national income. According to Figure 1, in 2012, 
consumption tax accounted for a 3.7% share of national income (including local consumption tax). 
As the consumption tax rate in 2010 was 5%, calculations for a rate of 8% yield a share of around 
5.92% of national income, while a 10% rate yields a share of around 7.4%. Nonetheless, the burden 
of consumption tax as a percentage of national income will decrease if reduced tax rates are applied 
to food products. 
 
 
Figure 1. International comparison of consumption tax burden as percentage of national 
income 
Source: Ministry of Finance, “Consumption taxes as percentage of national income” (National and 
local taxes), 2012; OECD, “Revenue Statistics 1965-2013” and “National Accounts.”  
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roughly similar share of national income to that of the consumption tax with a rate of 5%. The 
burden of excise taxes in Britain, Germany, France, and Sweden also accounts for an approximate 
5% share of national income.  
  Accordingly, when considering the burden of indirect taxes on households, it is necessary to take 
into account the burden of excise taxes in addition to that of consumption ones. Any arguments on 
the regressivity of consumption taxes are bound to be inadequate if they fail to consider excise taxes. 
  Previous studies attempting to estimate indirect tax burdens on households include those by 
Poterba (1991), Delfin et al. (2005), and André et al. (2010). Poterba (1991) investigates the 
regressivity of gasoline tax for households across different expenditure classes, showing that the 
burden of the gasoline tax as a share of total expenditure was less regressive than as a share of 
household income. Delfin et al. (2005) use a social accounting matrix to evaluate South African VAT 
and find that it was mildly regressive. They also consider an increase in VAT when zero tax rates 
were applied to daily necessities as a means to ameliorate regressivity and secure government 
revenues. André et al. (2010) analyzes the regressivity of indirect taxes (VAT and commodity taxes) 
by income group in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, and Britain). 
They conclude that these indirect taxes are regressive in relation to disposable income levels in each 
of the five countries. 
  Mirrlees et al. (2010, 2011) argue for consideration to be given to low-income earners in light of 
the acknowledged regressivity of the VAT, and provide proposals for British taxation reform 
following the Meade report. They also conclude that a more comprehensive and uniform system of 
indirect taxation, as well the application of a single VAT rate to a wide range of goods would be 
preferable. 
  Each of the studies mentioned found evidence for the regressivity of indirect taxes. While these 
studies analyze the burden on households of VAT, individual excise taxes or aggregated indirect 
taxes, they do not specifically measure the burden of all indirect taxation, including consumption and 
excise taxes. 
  Japanese studies that calculate indirect tax burdens on households include those by Hayashi and 
Hashimoto (1993), and Uemura (2006).1 Although they analyze the impacts of most typical indirect 
taxes on representative households, they do not measure indirect tax burden by income group. These 
measurements are essential in order to assess the degree of indirect tax regressivity.  
  Accordingly, this paper measures the burden of excise and consumption taxes by income group 
and explains the structure of indirect tax burdens inclusive of excise taxes in Japan.2 On this basis, 
we consider measures to ameliorate the regressivity of indirect taxes, including the consumption tax. 
                                                   
1 Uemura (2006) measures the tax burden on households for the commodity tax, an excise tax prior 
to the introduction of the consumption tax. 
2 This paper updates the estimations of Saitoh and Uemura (2011) using new data. 
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  The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview of the regime of indirect taxes 
paid by Japanese households; section 3 estimates the burden of indirect taxes according to income 
group; section 4 evaluates the structure of the estimated indirect tax burden according to income 
group; section 5 considers the policy response to multiple tax rates debated in recent years, such as a 
lower or zero tax on food products; and conclusions and policy implications are given in section 6.  
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF INDIRECT TAXATION IN JAPAN 
 
  This section provides an overview of the system of indirect taxation in Japan and analyzes 
national and local taxes separately. Japan’s consumption tax was raised to 8% in April 2014, while 
the data used is prior to 2012. Hence, this study examines the system of indirect taxation as of 2012 
with a consumption tax rate of 5%. As the purpose of this paper is to establish the burden of indirect 
taxation on households, subsections 2.1 and 2.2 present the indirect taxes paid by households. 
 
2.1 NATIONAL INDIRECT TAXATION 
 
  First, the consumption tax was initially designed to be paid by households and is levied on 
transactions, with businesses paying at each stage of the commodity distribution process. The 
amount of tax payable is obtained by multiplying the tax rate by the amount of taxable sales and 
deducting the amount of tax paid at the time of purchase. Purchase tax deductions are carried out by 
using a books of accounts method that requires the keeping of accounts and the preservation of 
invoice amounts. 
  Between April 1997 and the end of March 2014, the local consumption tax was calculated by 
multiplying the local rate of 25% by the amount of payable consumption tax at the national rate; that 
is, the tax rate of 5% included the national consumption tax rate of 4% and the local tax converted 
rate of 1%. Since April 2014, the consumption tax was raised to 8%, which is comprised of a 6.3% 
national tax and a converted local tax rate of 1.7%.3 
  Two special consumption tax related measures aimed at small and medium sized businesses have 
been established in Japan: an exemption of tax liability and a simplified tax system. Under the tax 
exemption system, businesses with annual taxable sales of less than 10 million yen are not required 
to pay the consumption tax. Meanwhile, the simplified tax system is aimed at businesses with annual 
taxable sales of less than 50 million yen, whereby the input tax may be calculated by multiplying the 
deemed purchase rate by the tax on sales.4 
                                                   
3 From April 2017, the consumption tax will be set at 10%. This will be comprised of a national 
consumption tax rate of 7.8% plus a 2.2% local tax rate.  
4 The deemed purchase rates are set at 90% for Type 1 Businesses (wholesalers), 80% for Type 2 
Businesses (retailers), 70% for Type 3 Businesses (producers), 60% for Type 4 Business (other 
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  Under the tax liability exemption system, when a tax liability is exempted, it creates a tax profit. 
Within the simplified tax system, where the deemed purchase rate is higher than the actual purchase 
rate, tax amounts to the difference between the two tax profits. Tax profits are considered legal 
business earnings, just as if they were profits, which the business would have to pay taxes for 
without any preferential treatment. 
  Nonetheless, compared to when the consumption tax was originally introduced, the scope of tax 
profits has been gradually reduced owing to the multiple adjustments carried out since then.5 In 
addition, Japan’s consumption tax is not applied to all goods and services, with some non-taxable 
transactions being specified.6  
  The second is the liquor tax, which is levied at different rates depending on the type of alcohol. 
For example, for every liter, a tax of 220 yen is payable for beer, 120 yen for sake rice wine, 200 yen 
for shochu sprits, 80 yen for wine, and 370 yen for whiskey. The tax rate on happoshu, a low-malt 
beer, differs according to the percentage of malt used, with a rate of 178.125 yen per liter of product 
containing between 25% and 50% malt, and 134.25 yen for one containing less than 25% malt.  
  The third is the national tobacco tax. The tobacco tax is set as 106.04 yen per box of 20 cigarettes. 
In addition, a special tobacco surtax of 16.4 yen is levied. 
  The fourth are the various energy related indirect taxes. A gasoline tax is levied at a rate of 48.6 
yen, and a local gasoline tax is levied at a rate of 5.2 yen per liter.7 A motor vehicle tonnage tax is 
collected at 5,000 yen per 0.5 tons of weight for passenger vehicles along with a promotion of power 
resources development tax of 400 yen per 1,000 kilowatt-hour of electricity sold.  
 
2.2 LOCAL INDIRECT TAXATION 
 
  While many local indirect taxes were abolished with the introduction of the consumption tax in 
April 1989, some have remained. 
  The most representative local indirect taxes are the local tobacco taxes. A prefectural tobacco tax 
is levied at 21.48 yen, and a municipal one at 65.96 yen per box of 20 cigarettes. From April 2013, 
these rates were set at 17.2 yen and 105.24 yen, respectively.  
  A further local indirect tax is the automobile acquisition tax, which is levied at the point of 
                                                                                                                                                     
types) and 50% for Type 5 Businesses (service industry, etc.). 
5 In principle, the consumption tax was not intended to be paid by businesses but by consumers. 
However, due to the circumstances surrounding its introduction, preferential measures were put in 
place for small to medium sized businesses. 
6 Non-taxable transactions involve land, securities, interest on loans, postal stamps, revenue stamps, 
government administrative fees, services provided under the Health Insurance Act and Long-Term 
Care Insurance Act, services provided under the Social Welfare Services Act, midwifery services, 
burial or cremation charges, school fees at certain schools, school textbooks, and housing loans. 
7 The gasoline tax was previously known as the local roads tax prior to 2007. 
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acquisition. This tax is set at 5% of the value of private vehicles, and 3% of the value of business 
vehicles, and a light oil delivery tax is levied at 32.1 yen per liter. In addition, there exists a golf 
course utilization tax with a standard rate of 800 yen per person per day, and a bathing tax of 150 
yen per person per day.8 
 
3. ESTIMATION OF INDIRECT TAX BURDENS BY INCOME GROUP 
 
  In this section, we describe the method used to estimate indirect tax burdens by income group. For 
estimation, we use data from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, including the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the National Survey 
of Family Income and Expenditure, the Population Census, Linked Input-Output Tables, the White 
Paper on Local Public Finance, and the National Tax Agency’s Annual Statistics Report. The 
estimation period covers the 12 years from 2001 to 2012. 
  Following the example of Hayashi and Hashimoto (1993), Murasawa et al. (2005), and Uemura 
(2006), the effective indirect tax rate, τij, against consumption expenditure item j for income group i 
is measured using equation (1). Rij indicates the macro indirect tax revenue against consumption item 
j of income group i. Cij indicates macro household consumption of consumption expenditure j of 
income group i. A is an adjustment factor.  
𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝐴     (1) 
  “Consumption expenditure item” refers to the 10 major consumption items in FIES (j = 1, …, 10) 
and income groups are divided into the ten brackets in the same survey (I = 1, …, 10). Below, we 
explain the procedure followed in estimating the indirect tax burden rates according to income 
groups. 
  The indirect effective tax rate, τi, is based on the macro indirect tax revenue, Rij, from 
consumption item j paid by income group i, divided by macro household consumption, Cij, of 
consumption item j by income group i. As the data comes from sampling surveys, the difference 
between the figures for aggregated tax revenues derived from FIES and the actual macro tax 
revenues is problematic. Thus, we use the adjustment factor, A, as proposed by Murasawa et al. 
(2005).  
  Some excise taxes are paid by both households and businesses. By extracting the portion paid by 
households from the Linked Input-Output Tables, we estimate the amount paid by these. Additionally, 
from the estimated indirect effective tax rate, τij, we calculate the indirect tax contribution rates, bij 
and Bi, in order to identify regressivity. In summary, the steps for estimating the indirect tax burden 
                                                   
8 Local governments independently levy a number of indirect taxes. These taxes vary widely in type 
and do not bring in significant revenues, and thus are not discussed in this paper. 
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are: 
 
Step 1: Estimation of macro household consumption by income group 
Step 2: Sorting of macro indirect tax revenues into 10 major consumption expenditure items 
Step 3: Estimation of household burden ratio 
Step 4: Adjustment of indirect effective tax rate, τij, of consumption expenditures by income group 
Step 5: Estimation of indirect tax burden rate by income group and consumption expenditure items. 
bij, and indirect tax burden rate by income group, Bi. 
 
  First, we estimate macro household consumption, Cij, for consumption item j of income group i, 
which is the denominator for the indirect tax effective tax rate in equation (1). “Consumption 
expenditures” and “yearly income” against each of the 10 major expenditure items are obtained from 
the “Yearly amount of expenditures and purchase frequency of commodities per household (total 
households)” within FIES. Consumption expenditures for each of the 10 major consumption items 
correspond to each of the individual consumption expenditure items within the definition of the 
effective indirect tax rate. Consumption expenditures by consumption item are as follows: 
 
“Consumption expenditures” for income group i 
＝ Food + Housing + Fuel, light and water charges + Furniture and household utensils + 
Clothing and footwear 
+ Medical care + Transportation and communication + Education + Culture and recreation 
+ Other consumption expenditures.     (2) 
 
  The above consumption also includes some expenditure not subject to the consumption tax. 
Accordingly, these are captured as follows: 
 
Consumption expenditures for income group i not subject to consumption tax 
= Rents for dwelling and land (housing) + Medical services (medical care) 
+ School fees (education).      (3) 
 
  The data obtained above are from calendar years, and have been converted to fiscal year data. For 
example, the 2001 fiscal year data is obtained by summing up three-quarters of the data from the 
2001 calendar year and one-quarter of the data from the 2002 calendar year. The reason for this is 
that the revenue from indirect taxes is collected per financial year, not per calendar year. Data for 
monthly amounts is converted into annual amounts by multiplying it with 12. 
  Subsequently, we obtain data on the total number of ordinary households from the Population 
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Census. This census is carried out every five years, thus for each of the years for which there is no 
data the total number of households is estimated by linear interpolation across the estimation period 
of 2001-2012. As there is no data collected on the number of households in each income group, the 
total number of households obtained from the Population Census was divided into ten income 
groups. 
  Consequently, we estimate macro household consumption, Cij, according to consumption items in 
each income group by multiplying household consumption data for each item and income group in 
each fiscal year, as obtained in FIES, by the total number of households in each income group 
obtained from the Population Census. This is the denominator of the effective indirect tax rate, τij, in 
equation (1). 
  We subsequently estimate the macro indirect tax revenue, Rij, for each consumption item by 
income group, which is the numerator of the indirect effective tax rate, τij, in equation (1). For 
national taxes, we have used general and special accounts tax revenue data from the “Tax and stamp 
revenues” of the National Tax Agency Annual Statistics Report. For data on local taxes, we have 
used prefectural and municipal inhabitant taxes revenue data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications “White Paper on Local Public Finance”. 
  In order to measure the indirect tax burden according to consumption item and income group, we 
distribute macro indirect tax revenue data for each income group amongst the consumption 
expenditure items. Revenues from indirect taxation are distributed proportionally across each 
consumption expenditure item and consumption tax applied to most goods and services is 
apportioned to consumption items by income group via shares, from which untaxed consumption 
expenditures from FIES have been deducted. Consumption share by income group is obtained by 
dividing household consumption data for each consumption item at each decile by household 
consumption data for each consumption item. 
  Table 1 shows at a glance how revenues from each indirect tax are apportioned across the 10 
major consumption expenditure items. 
  The gasoline tax, local road tax, light oil delivery tax, promotion of power sources development 
tax, and the automobile acquisition tax are borne by both businesses and households. Thus, we have 
extracted the tax revenues from households by measuring the proportion of the indirect tax burden 
borne by households from the Linked Input-Output Tables. For details on how the proportion of 
household burden was measured, please refer to the addendum. 
  Hitherto, we have distributed indirect tax revenues across consumption expenditure items 
according to income group for the financial years 2001-2012. With macro consumption for each 
consumption item and income group, Cij, as denominator and the indirect tax revenues for each item 
and income group as numerator, we calculate the unadjusted effective tax rates of indirect taxes. 
  While macro consumption, the indirect tax effective rate denominator, is estimated using FIES 
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data, consumption data from this survey is known to be underestimated in comparison with macro 
consumption data.9 Accordingly, dividing the effective consumption tax rate, tN, derived from the 
nominal tax rate by the estimated effective consumption tax rate, tE, gives adjustment factor A, which 
is multiplied by the pre-adjusted effective indirect tax rate to obtain the effective indirect tax rate, τij. 
In measuring adjustment factor A we refer to Murasawa et al. (2005).  A＝ 𝑡𝑁
𝑡𝐸
      (4) 
 
Table 1. Indirect tax types and distribution of revenues among 10 major consumption 
expenditure items 
Tax Distribution amongst 10 consumption items 
National Taxes  
  Consumption tax and local consumption tax Proportional distribution amongst 10 major 
consumption expenditure items via consumption 
shares by income group from which untaxed 
consumption from FIES is deducted 
  Liquor tax ‘Food’ 
  Tobacco tax, special tobacco surtax ‘Other consumption expenditures’ 
  Gasoline tax ‘Transportation and communication’, extracting 
household burden from Linked Input-Output 
Tables 
  Local road tax ‘Transportation and communication’, extracting 
household burden from Linked Input-Output 
Tables 
  Promotion of power resources development tax ‘Fuel, light and water charges’, extracting 
household burden from Linked Input-Output 
Tables 
Prefectural taxes  
  Prefectural tobacco tax (Prefectural tobacco consumption 
tax) 
‘Other consumption expenditures’ 
  Golf course utilization tax (Recreational facility 
utilization tax) 
‘Culture and recreation’ 
  Special local taxes (Food and beverage consumption tax, 
amusement and drinking tax) 
‘Food’ 
  Automobile acquisition tax ‘Transportation and communication’, extracting 
household burden from Linked Input-Output 
Tables 
Municipal Taxes  
  Municipal tobacco tax (Municipal tobacco consumption 
tax) 
‘Other consumption expenditures’ 
  Bathing tax ‘Culture and recreation’ 
 
  With a national consumption tax rate of 4% and a local consumption tax rate of 1%, the effective 
consumption tax rate, tN, obtained from the nominal one, using an aggregated nominal tax rate of 5% 
                                                   
9 Refer to Iwamoto et al. (1995, 1996). This includes problems such as that of imputed rents. 
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is 4.762% (i.e., 5% / (1 + 5%)). Meanwhile, the estimated effective consumption tax rate, tE, is the 
estimated effective rate of consumption taxes excluding indirect taxes other than those obtained up 
to this point (i.e., macro consumption tax revenues against consumption expenditure item j for 
income group i / household consumption excluding macro untaxed items of consumption 
expenditure item j for income group i). 
  Adjustment factor A has an approximate value of 0.5.10 While the adjustment factor has been 
obtained by focusing on consumption tax, the disparity between FIES consumption data and macro 
consumption data is believed to affect all indirect taxes. 
  Applying adjustment factor A to equation (1), we estimate the effective indirect tax rate, τij, for 
each consumption expenditure item by income group. Concerning consumption tax, the effective 
indirect tax rate for adjusted consumption tax only equals the effective consumption tax rate, tE, 
obtained from the nominal tax rate. 
  In order to check for regressivity within indirect tax burdens by income group we measure the 
proportion of tax burden as a share of income. Hitherto, we have measured the (adjusted) effective 
indirect tax rate, τij, by consumption item and income group. Consequently, we are able to obtain the 
indirect tax burden rate, bij, by consumption items and income groups as per equation (5): 
𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑖 .     (5) 
FIES consumption data by item and income group is represented by cij, and yearly income by yij. The 
indirect tax burden rate by income group with aggregated consumption expenditure items, Bi, is 
obtained using the equation below: 
𝐵𝑖 = ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑖 .     (6) 
 
4. THE BURDEN OF INDIRECT TAXATION BY INCOME GROUP 
 
  Figure 2 displays indirect tax burden rates by income group as calculated using the procedure 
described above. While results have not been obtained for every financial year between 2001 and 
2012, due to the absence of any large-scale tax reforms during the estimation period, no particularly 
significant differences can be seen among the analyzed years. Indirect tax burden rates by income 
group are shown in relation to indirect taxation overall, consumption tax, and excise tax. 
  As an overall trend, the indirect tax burden of low-income earners is relatively high. Regarding 
the burden of indirect taxation overall, the first decile is up to three times larger than the tenth. 
Accordingly, we can confirm the regressivity of indirect taxation inclusive of excise taxes.  
                                                   
10 Estimations by Uemura (2006), and Saitoh and Uemura (2011) use an adjustment factor of around 
0.5. 
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Figure 2. Indirect tax burden rates by income group 
 
  Looking at the burden of consumption and excise taxes, the burden rate for the former is higher 
than that of the latter. While consumption and excise taxes account for a similar portion of national 
income, we have only considered the proportion of excise taxes paid by households, which is 
proportionally lower than the amount paid by businesses. 
  From the figure, we see that consumption tax burden rate drops more steeply than that for excise 
tax from the first to tenth decile. This indicates that the relative weight of consumption tax 
regressivity is larger than that of excise tax. 
  As no significant differences exist amongst the years, the discussion below is based on data from 
FY2012. Figure 3 shows the indirect tax burden rate for each consumption expenditure item and 
income group.  
  From each of the tax burden rates shown, we can see which consumption items account for 
regressivity in consumption taxation. Figure 3 shows that the consumption tax burden rate for food, 
in particular, drops steeply from the first decile to the tenth, and hence regressivity is relatively 
high.11 The fact that consumption taxes applied to food are particularly regressive may provide 
justification for measures to reduce the tax burden of low-income earners. 
                                                   
11 Yearly income for each decile in 2012, as reported by FIES, were as follows (in yen, millions): 
1.26, 2.14, 2.79, 3.37, 3.96, 4.65, 5.46, 6.54, 8.13, and 13.17, from the first to the tenth decile. 
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Figure 3. Consumption tax burden rates by consumption expenditure item and income group 
(FY2012) 
 
  Figure 4 shows the burden rates of excise taxes for each consumption expenditure item. For ease 
of comparison, units along the vertical axis in both Figures 3 and 4 are aligned. As with the 
consumption tax figures, regressivity can be noted amongst most consumption items. Nonetheless, 
burden rates for consumption tax shown in Figure 3 are higher than those for excise taxes shown in 
Figure 4. 
  However, “Transportation and Communication” shows a higher burden rate for excise tax than it 
does for consumption tax, due to the burden of excise taxes such as the gasoline tax. In addition, 
while the burden rate for “Food” is higher than that of other consumption items, the main cause of 
this is the liquor tax. The burden rate for “Other Consumption Expenditures” is largely driven by 
tobacco related taxes. 
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Figure 4. Excise tax burden rates by consumption expenditure item and income group 
(FY2012) 
 
5. THE EFFECTS OF A CONSUMPTION TAX INCREASE ON INDIRECT TAX BURDEN 
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  Hitherto, this paper discusses the structure of indirect tax burden rates inclusive of consumption 
taxation by income groups in Japan. The consumption tax has been raised in the past in an effort to 
secure funding for social security programs. Accordingly, we apply an analytical framework to 
consider the effects of an increase in the consumption tax on the household indirect tax burden rates. 
We give particular attention to the issue of regressivity associated with the consumption tax. 
  Figure 5 shows the results of test calculations for several policy patterns related to the 
consumption tax, based on the indirect tax burden rates by income group for FY2012. The graph 
indicates five patterns of indirect tax burdens corresponding to each of the five cases described. Case 
1 is used as a benchmark whereby the consumption tax is set at 5%. Cases 2 to 5 all involve an 
increase to 10%. 
  As consumption tax increases are criticized for their regressivity, we consider several policy 
patterns including a tax reduction on food, a zero tax rate on food, and a partial tax refund.12 
  As such, the following cases are considered: 
                                                   
12 Case 5 considers providing a refund of the 5% consumption tax levied on food. 
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Case 1: Consumption tax 5% + Excise taxes (present rates) 
Case 2: Consumption tax 10% + Excise taxes (present rates) 
Case 3: Consumption tax (excluding food) 10% + Food consumption tax 5% + Excise taxes (present 
rates) 
Case 4: Consumption tax (excluding food) 10% + Food consumption tax 0% + Excise taxes (present 
rates) 
Case 5: Consumption tax 10％ + Food consumption tax – 5% + Excise taxes (present rates) 
 
 
Figure 5. Indirect tax burden rates for each income group under an increased consumption tax 
scenario 
 
  Consumption tax regressivity rises relative to the tax increase. In particular, the lines in Figure 5 
decline more steeply from the first decile in Cases 2, 3, and 4 compared to the other two cases.  
  We consider a reduced tax rate and zero tax rate applied to food as a means of ameliorating 
regressivity. Case 3 leaves the consumption tax on food at 5%, while Case 4 applies a zero tax rate to 
food. Nonetheless, as can be seen in the indirect tax burden rate under Case 4, regressivity is not 
easily dealt with, even when a zero tax rate on food is applied. 
  Thus, as a further means of mitigating regressivity, we consider Case 5, in which a negative 5% 
rate on food is applied, that is, measuring the effects of refunding the 5% tax burden on food to 
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households. Relative to the other cases, the descending trend from the first decile is somewhat flatter, 
indicating a slight reduction in regressivity. Nevertheless, in all cases the overall tax burden for each 
income group is higher than the benchmark Case 1.  
  Finally, in order to evaluate these regimes of indirect taxation as a whole, we calculated 
redistribution effects by finding the extent of improvement in the Gini coefficient in each case. The 
redistribution effect, E, is obtained by the following equation: E(%) = 100 (𝐺𝐼−𝐺𝑇)
𝐺𝑇
.    (7) 
Here, GI represents the Gini coefficient for yearly income, and GT indicates the Gini coefficient of 
yearly income minus indirect tax burden. Results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Redistribution effect under different tax regimes by income group 
Case 1 Consumption tax 5% + Excise taxes (present rates) －1.52% 
Case 2 Consumption tax 10% + Excise taxes (present rates) －2.62% 
Case 3 Consumption tax (excluding food) 10% + Food consumption tax 5% + 
Excise taxes (present rates) 
－2.23% 
Case 4 Case 4 Consumption tax (excluding food) 10% + Food consumption tax 
0%+ Excise taxes (present rates) 
－1.88% 
Case 5 Consumption tax 10％+ Food consumption tax – 5% + Excise taxes 
(present rates) 
－1.52% 
 
  The negative values for the redistribution effect, E, is due to the regressivity of indirect taxation. 
From Table 2, the most regressive scenario is that of Case 2, whereby the consumption tax rate is 
raised to 10%. Cases 3 and 4 are considered as a means of mitigating this regressivity by seeing the 
effects of reduced or zero rates, but these do not result in positive improvements in the Gini 
coefficients.  
  Moreover, even providing a tax refund produced no marked improvement over the benchmark 
Case 1. This is because reducing tax rates, setting zero tax rates, and refunding tax lowers the tax 
burden for low and high-income earners alike. Thus, attempts to mitigate tax regressivity associated 
with a rise in the consumption tax should involve social security policies heavily targeted towards 
low-income earners, as opposed to the application of reduced/zero tax rates or refunds. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  In this paper, we have explained the structure of indirect tax burdens including excise taxes in 
Japan by measuring the burden of excise and consumption taxation by income group.  
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  The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, low-income earners are exposed 
to a relatively high burden of indirect taxation. Comparing the first and tenth deciles of income 
earners, the first decile was found to have an overall indirect tax burden rate of around three times 
the size of that of the tenth decile. Thus, we can conclude that the system of indirect taxation overall, 
even including excise taxes, is a regressive one.  
  Secondly, consumption tax was found to be more regressive than excise taxation. In particular, the 
tax burden rate associated with food was found to be relatively regressive and most onerous amongst 
the first decile of income earners. This may require some type of policy measure aimed at reducing 
the regressivity of consumption tax applied to food for low-income earners. 
  Thirdly, regarding the excise tax burdens, for “Transportation and Communication” the excise tax 
burden rate is higher than the consumption tax. This is due to the presence of excise taxes such as the 
gasoline tax.  
  Finally, we considered the effects on household indirect tax burdens occasioned by an increase in 
the consumption tax. Estimating the outcomes of several policy patterns, we found that regressivity 
increases alongside the consumption tax rate. Our measurements of redistributive effects show that, 
even accompanied by policies aimed at mitigating this regressivity, an increase in the consumption 
tax produces a negative redistribution across all income groups. This is because policies providing 
for reduced tax rates, zero tax rates, or tax refunds lower the tax burden for both low- and 
high-income earners alike. 
  In order to lower the tax regressivity accompanying any increase in the consumption tax, social 
security policies closely targeting low-income earners are required, instead of lowering tax rates, 
setting zero tax rates or providing tax refunds to all income earners.  
  In Japan’s “Comprehensive Reform of Tax and Social Security,” the increase in revenue afforded 
by raising the consumption tax is to be used for social security expenditures. Instead of using lower 
tax rates to redistribute income, a more effective policy would redistribute income via social security 
spending. Highly target and efficient income redistribution policies will be more important than 
policies seeking to lower the burden of indirect taxation. 
 
ADDENDUM. MEASURING THE PROPORTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD INDIRECT TAX 
BURDENS 
 
  Here we measure the proportion of household indirect tax burdens. In principle, this is calculated 
from the Linked Input-Output Tables, which is released every five years. For the four-year periods in 
between reporting years, figures are estimated by linear interpolation. As the data from 2006 
onwards was unavailable, we used the same proportions as those in 2005. 
  From the data for “Producer’s Price,” “Nominal Values,” and “Transaction Amount” in the Linked 
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Input-Output Tables we define the household burden proportion, Sn, for indirect tax n as per equation 
(8). Household consumption expenditure is represented as Cn, total domestic demand as Tn and 
increase in stocks as In. 
𝑆𝑛 = 𝐶𝑛(𝑇𝑛−𝐼𝑛)     (8) 
The increase in stocks, In, is obtained by the sum of the increase in producer’s stocks of finished 
goods, Pn, the increase in semi-finished goods and works in progress, Hn, the increase in dealer’s 
stocks of goods, Dn, and the increase in stocks of raw materials and supplies, Rn.  
𝐼𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛 + 𝐻𝑛 + 𝐷𝑛 + 𝑅𝑛    (9) 
The proportions of household burdens, Sn, thus estimated are shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Proportions of household burdens  
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